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Abstract

The amorphous landscape of Internet technology and modern music
sharing allows music listeners to instantly access new works from different
artists at any location across the globe. Entities like YouTube have developed
server space to lend to users who upload digital music and stream the content
for public enjoyment. SoundCloud, a service founded in 2007 and based in
Berlin, Germany 1, has expanded upon this concept by encouraging its users
to create their own works of audio artistry and upload these works to share
with others. The facilitation of sharing works through SoundCloud has let it
become perhaps the most popular music sharing platforms today.
The most significant problem faced by SoundCloud, along with similar
service providers that have followed suit, is that, along with original works
that the service was initially intended for, a wealth of copyrighted material is
uploaded and shared by and amongst its users.

2

Intensifying the problem,

the platform’s promotion of sharing the new works has allowed users, and
perhaps encouraged them, to freely upload musical creations that are often
derivative works of copyrighted materials (i.e. samples, remixes, and edits of
copyrighted tracks).

The design of the platform complicates the task of

SoundCloud Review, APP APPEAL, http://www.appappeal.com/app/soundcloud
See Jing Xu, DMCA Safe Harbors and the Future of New Digital Music Sharing Platforms, 11
Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 145; see also Ryan Tranzmission, Copyright Wars: Tranzmission vs. Interpol vs.
SoundCloud, TRANZMISSION, http://www.thetranzmission.com/2010/08/copyright-warstranzmission-vs-interpol.html (reporting a SoundCloud request to remove a track the author believed
he obtained permission to upload).)
1
2

2

separating songs that have been altered enough to constitute a new work, or
transformational use of a copyrighted work, from those that may have been
minimally altered—hiding the fact that a particular song is copyrighted.
SoundCloud’s challenge has become identifying the use of the platform that
may give rise to copyright infringement while still allowing the free-flow of
presenting and sharing non-infringing music.
To detect uses of its service that constitute infringement, SoundCloud
has implemented the use of Audible Magic, a “fingerprinting technology” that
can automatically identify copyrighted works as they are uploaded onto a
user’s page through the service.
technology.

4

3

However, Audible Magic is an inconsistent

Most deliberate copies of copyrighted songs are removed

consistently, as the audio recognition software accurately identifies songs that
have not been altered in any way.

5

Nonetheless, problems arise when the

technology attempts to analyze remixes, samples, and edits of copyrighted
materials.

Some of these altered songs are successfully identified and

removed, while other alterations of the same song are not detected by Audible
Magic’s algorithms and remain available.

6

This has led to situations where

Eamonn Forde, SoundCloud Partners with Audible Magic for Rights Identification, MUSICWEEK
(Jan. 5, 2011, 10:05
AM), http://www.musicweek.com/story.asp?storyCode=1043741&sectioncode=1.
4
See Scott Smitelli, Fun with YouTube 's Audio Content ID System, COMPUTER SCIENCE
HOUSE (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.csh.rit.edu/~parallax/ (finding that "any pitch or time alterations
will also work [to override Audible Magic], provided you apply a 6% or greater change to the
parameter you are adjusting").
5
See Technology Overview, AUDIBLE MAGIC, http://audiblemagic.com/technology.php
(detailing how Audible Magic identifies unless the user is solely purchasing extra server space to store
and share snippets of audio files and then matches the sound clip with a database containing more
than 11 million copyrighted songs).
6
Id.
3

3

users whose works are flagged for infringement have found that other works
with seemingly equal levels of infringement remain unflagged. The presence
of these works that have slipped through the fingertips of the fingerprinting
technology reside in the grey area of copyright law

7

and have been the

subject of litigation brought by copyright holders against SoundCloud.
There has been a hotly contested debate in the field of copyright law as
to whether SoundCloud’s platform, and other similar service providers, by
design, gives rise to a prima facie case for copyright infringement. This debate
calls for the examination of Digital Millennium Copyright Act

8

(“DMCA”) safe

harbor provisions, the implications of these provisions, as well as possible fair
use defenses as they apply to the innovative functionality of SoundCloud. This
begs the question of whether the current growth of the platform can be
sustained without having to sacrifice the original creative utility provided to
its end-users.

See Tonya M. Evans, Sampling, Looping, and Mashing . . . Oh My!: How Hip Hop Music Is
Scratching More Than the Surface of Copyright Law, EXPRESSO, 3 (2011) (discussing a circuit split
over the fair use status of remixes), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=tonya_evans.
8
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05.
7

4

I. SoundCloud’s Innovative Platform

SoundCloud’s innovative platform integrates a unique feature that
creates visual representations of sound, allows playback and the optional
ability to download audio files, and encourages users to provide feedback and
interact with other users at specific points throughout the visual waveform (a
waveform player is one that visualizes sound).

9

SoundCloud offers a free

service to the public but also generates revenue through user subscriptions.
Revenue is generated by the service by using a tiered subscription model with
no advertisements. 10

Because of the subscription model, SoundCloud’s

revenue stream does not suffer as much from the use of Audible Magic as an
ad-based model would.

11

With SoundCloud’s subscription model, regardless

of infringing material, users will still pay the initial signup fee because utility
remains to be derived from legitimate uses of service.

12

A. Features
SoundCloud’s software takes an audio file and, during an upload from a
user, generates a visual representation of the audio file’s sound. By creating
a “waveform” map, other users can identify a specific moment or section of

Your Sound, in the Player, SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/tour/
Eliot Van Buskirk, SoundCloud Threatens MySpace as Music Destination for Twitter
Era, WIRED (Jul. 6, 2009, 5:20 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/07/soundcloud-threatensmyspace-as-music-destination-for-twitter-era.
11
Id.
12
Id.
9

10
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the music that is of particular interest to them.

13

This visualization gives

users an alternative conceptualization of a track’s production, allowing them
to note where a particular section begins or ends and how sounds are amassed
to produce the final piece.

14

Users can also leave personal comments,

suggestions, or feedback that visually represents itself at specific points in the
waveform, creating potential back-and-forth communication between users.
15

The unique ability to display the waveform of any given uploaded track
while receiving continuous feedback from other music aficionados makes
SoundCloud a particularly appealing platform for new artists who are trying to
build a network of fans, fellow musicians, and potential collaborators.

16

It is

also a useful service to more established producers and DJs, who are
constantly looking for new ways to quickly distribute material to widespread
audiences.

17

SoundCloud’s interactive features help to manifest a feeling of

personal investment in others’ artistry, which strengthens the sense of
community among users in any particular genre of music. The waveforms are
also easily embedded on popular blog sites

18

and directly into Facebook and

Your Sound, in the Player, supra note 10.
See, e.g., Jon Charnis, EG AFTER.011 SOUNDCLOUD, https://soundcloud.com/egpodcast/egafter011-jon-charnis (depicting visually where sound buildup occurs and entering breaks to signify a
change in the momentum of the song).
15
Id.
16
See Van Buskirk, supra note 11 (noting that artists can quickly share improvements and
thoughts on new music).
17
See id. (emphasizing SoundCloud's connection to social media services such as Facebook and
Twitter).
18
See id. (explaining that SoundCloud creates a unique URL for each of an artist's tracks, which
allows them to embed the music elsewhere).
13
14
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Twitter posts.

19

SoundCloud also offers a free mobile application that notifies

users of recently uploaded material, recent user interactions, and other
information that users may find exciting.

20

With regard to privacy settings,

users have a range of autonomy—from opting to allow a file to be
downloadable, to opting to keep a file private and shared with only selected
users.

21

True to its mantra, through these interactive features, SoundCloud “puts
your sound at the heart of communities, websites and even apps.”

22

A user

can watch conversations, connections and social experiences happen through
the medium of sharing music.

23

It is this call to personal creativity,

collaboration, and musical innovation along with no file-size limitations and
customizable sharing options, that separates this platform from other similar
services.

24

Intrinsically, and ironically, it is because of these unique features,

together with the service’s emphasis on “your sound,” that the uploader often
assumes that they own the audio files. The problematic presence of infringing

David Noël, Updated Facebook Application, SOUNDCLOUD BLOG (Jan. 15,
2010), http://blog.soundcloud.com/2010/01/15/facebook/.
20
Mike Ziarko, SoundCloud Social Music Community Lets You Visually Comment On
Music, SOCIAL TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010, 3:45 PM), http://www.socialtimes.com/2010/12/soundcloudsocial-music-community-lets-you-visually-comment-on-music/.
21
SoundCloud Review, supra note 1.
22
SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/ (last visited Dec. 05, 2016).
23
Id.
24
Van Buskirk, supra note 11 ("In a few short months SoundCloud has begun to give [social
media platforms] a run for the hearts and minds of recording artists eager to interact more nimbly
with fans than is possible on [these giant social networks].").
19

7

material remains pervasive because of the essence of this ubiquitous
misnomer.

25

B. Monetization Model
SoundCloud has more than 175 million unique monthly listeners (as of
January 2016).

26

The expansion of the platform into mobile applications for

iPhone and Android users has caused exponential increase in the service’s
user base.

27

Through this growth, SoundCloud found opportunities to identify

high value and low value users. The differentiation allowed SoundCloud to
monetize its increasing user base by providing a variety of accounts,
incorporating both free and paid service options.

28

The free service provides

the basic waveform tools, but caps the number of uploadable minutes.

29

Accounts are then available to access additional features that are available at
different service tiers available at increasing prices depending on the tier.

30

Users can access more hours for uploads, more efficient distribution channels,
and greater recognition for their uploads, depending on the price of the

Tranzmission, supra note 3 (detailing a request to remove a track thought to be uploaded
with permission).
26
See SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/; see also Alex Moazed, Why SoundCloud Will Be
Worth More Than Spotify, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 24, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/01/24/whysoundcloud-will-be-worth-more-than-spotify/ (comparing SoundCloud to YouTube while likening
Spotify’s service to Netflix)
27
SoundCloud Reaches Three Million User Mark, NME (Feb. 11, 2011, 1:43 PM),
http://www.nme.com/news/various-artists/54934, supra note 29.
28
See SoundCloud Premium, SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/premium/
29
Id.
30
Id.
25

8

service.

Each account has limitations that can only be lifted by purchasing

31

a better plan.

32

There is no third party advertising at any account level, but

the appeal of the premium accounts is the unlimited uploading, adjustable
privacy settings and unlimited contacts.

33

C. Audible Magic Identification Technology
Since 2011, SoundCloud has used Audible Magic’s content identification
technology

34

to identify the upload of copyrighted material in a database

containing millions of songs.

35

Due to SoundCloud’s revenue model, which is

tied to offering heightened services in return for compensation as opposed to
the quantity of views per a user’s page, Audible Magic’s prevention of
infringing material does not hurt SoundCloud’s profitability as it would a site
such as YouTube.

36

Users that are inclined to use SoundCloud’s server space

to distribute infringing material would be unlikely to pay monthly for premium
service.

37

Users that consistently and knowingly uploaded infringing material

would reasonably choose to use a free account. Such users have no need to
pay for extra features when free accounts already allow for the private link

Id.
Help/Premium & Billing, SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/help/premium-accounts
33
Van Buskirk, supra note 11.
34
Forde, supra note 4.
35
Technology Overview, supra note 6.
36
See Michael Rappa, Business Models on the Web, DIGITAL ENTERPRISE
(2010), http://digitalenterprise.org/models/models.html (advertising models work best when the
volume of viewer traffic is large and subscription fees are incurred irrespective of actual usage rate).
37
Id.
31
32

9

sharing and download options. By the same token, premium users, such as
well known DJs or producers, are blocked from uploading music deemed by
the identification technology to be infringing, however that unutilized upload
time could still be used to upload non-infringing material. These professionals
are the type of users that SoundCloud had originally intended to attract.
However, in a way, the attraction of premium users may be coming to an end.
38

Audible Magic has proven itself problematic, despite the progressive
nature of this technology. Tests have shown that basic audial manipulation of
a copyrighted track (i.e. remixed or samples with no intention to avoid Audible
Magic’s detection) will fool the algorithm.

39

Although SoundCloud encourages

users to borrow and modify content, Audible Magic fails to catch many uploads
that infringe on copyrights.

40

The issue for SoundCloud is that its target

market is comprised of DJs, producers, and remixers, all of whom frequently
borrow and sample from copyrighted material.

41

These users experience

notoriety through the sharing of such remixed music on SoundCloud, leading

See Miles Raymer, SoundCloud Raining on Its Own Parade, CHICAGO READER (Mar. 3,
2011), http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/sharp-darts-soundcloudcopyright/Content?oid=3351152 (noting that "DJs were the early adopters that helped [SoundCloud]
reach critical mass," but they are feeling betrayed by recent practices that "appear to defer to rights
holders").
39
See Smitelli, supra note 5 (finding that the algorithm only recognizes a sound clip if it is a
certain length, while changes in pitch, tempo, or background white noise may successfully cloak the
clip).
40
See Larisa Mann, Walling Off Another Garden: Is Soundcloud Turning on Its
Supporters?, RIPLEY (Dec. 25, 2010), http://djripley.blogspot.com/2010/12/walling-off-anothergarden-is.html (positing that much of the content on SoundCloud would be considered infringing
material).
41
Id.
38
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to an erroneous belief that no legal repercussions exist due to uploading
potentially infringing content. Therefore, a significant number of infringing
files are successfully uploaded to SoundCloud’s servers

42

but are not removed

without the copyright holder’s express search and notice action.

43

See Evans, supra note 8, at 3 (discussing the circuit split over whether remixes of
copyrighted songs are still illegal).
43
Mann, supra note 44 (Copyright holders may file a takedown notice for an upload that they
believe to be infringing. The service provider is required to remove the accused upload even if the
copyright holder presents no evidence that it is actually infringing. The uploader may then file a
counter-notice that would force the copyright holder to provide proof.)
42

11

II. DMCA § 512(c) Safe Harbor Provision

To avoid liability, SoundCloud should comprise a strategy pursuant to
the Viacom v. YouTube decision.

44

The prevalent presence of arguably illegal

work on SoundCloud’s servers may incite major record labels or other rights
holders to sue.

45

With an understanding of the court’s decision in YouTube,

SoundCloud, along with other similar service providers, can better understand
the implications of the DMCA § 512(c) safe harbor, while foreseeing how to
best position themselves for protection.

46

A. The YouTube Decision’s Interpretation of DMCA Safe Harbors
1. Relevant § 512 provisions
Section 512(c)(1) of the DMCA provides that a service provider will not
be liable for storing copyright-infringing material if the service provider: (a)
“does not have actual knowledge that the material or activity using the
material on the system is infringing”; (b) “in the absence of such knowledge,
is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent”; or (c) “upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts

Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 940 F.Supp.2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that copyright
holder was suing YouTube over "tens of thousands of videos [that] were taken unlawfully" (quoting
Brief for Viacom, at 1)).
46
See generally Cassius Sims, A Hypothetical Non-Infringing Network: An Examination of the
Efficacy of Safe Harbor in Section 512(c) of the DMCA, 2009 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 9 (2009) (detailing
the various elements of DMCA Section 512(c) and the standards by which service providers might
qualify for protection).
44
45
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expeditiously to remove, or disable access to the material.”

47

Additionally,

the service provider cannot have received “a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing material” if the service provider “has the right
and ability to control such activity.”

48

Finally, § 512(c)(1)(C) requires the

service provider, when notified of a claimed infringement by the copyright
holder, to quickly “remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed
to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.”

49

Section 512(c)(2) and (3) set forth the necessary steps to satisfy the
notification requirement, and include the service provider’s designation of an
agent to receive notices, as well as which information the notice needs to
provide.

50

Section 512(m) expressly provides that the § 512(c) safe harbor

is not predicated on “(1) a service provider monitoring its service or
affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent
consistent … with the provisions of subsection (i)” or “(2) a service provider
gaining access to, removing, or disabling access to material in cases in which
such conduct is prohibited by law.”

51

Instead, § 512(i) requires a qualifying

service provider to implement a system that “provides for the termination in
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders … who are

47
48
49
50
51

Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C §§ 512(c)(1)
Id.
Id.
YouTube, 718 F.Supp.2d 514, 517-18.
Id. at 518.
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repeat

infringers.”

52

Additionally,

service

providers

must

also

“accommodate[e] and … not interfere with standard technical measures.”

53

In Youtube, the court identified a critical question with regard to
YouTube’s qualification for the DMCA safe harbor.

54

This question was

whether the “actual knowledge” and “facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent” language in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) required a
general awareness by YouTube of infringements, or, rather, required the
higher standard of “actual or constructive knowledge of specific and
identifiable infringements of individual items.”

55

The court held that the high

standard of actual or constructive knowledge was required.

56

2. Legislative History
Concerning the DMCA, the Senate and House Reports demonstrated
Congress’ dual concerns of providing an effective deterrence method to clear
and repeated cases of infringement while simultaneously ensuring that these
methods were not overly burdensome for service providers.

57

One of the

concerns that led to the creation of the safe harbor was to protect important

Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1).
Id.
54
YouTube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 519.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 520.
57
See id. at 522-23 (discussing § 512(d)—which deals with information location tools—
elaborating on specificity requirements as well as "red flag" cases of infringement involving "pirate"
sites that lead service providers to a greater likelihood of awareness of infringement in the absence of
actual knowledge. Also discussing the purpose of the safe harbor to "promote the development" of
service providers like Yahoo! as long as they follow the notice and takedown requirements).
52
53

14

service providers from having to implement practices that would be
impractical to execute on a large scale.

58

In YouTube, the court initially

examined the text of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report, and
stated that the overarching purpose of the DMCA was to “ensure that the
efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and
quality of the services on the Internet will continue to expand.”

59

Further,

the court examined the Senate Judiciary Committee Report and the House
Committee on Commerce Report to clarify § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)’s “actual
knowledge” language.

60

The court defined actual knowledge as “actual or

constructive knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements.”

61

Finally,

the court examined the Reports regarding how to approach the §
512(c)(1)(A)(ii) “red flag” test, which provides direction on how to know that
an “infringing activity is apparent.”

62

On the passage of the DMCA, the House and Senate Reports describe §
512(c)(1)(A)(ii) as a “red flag” test which requires “both a subjective and an
objective element.”

63

The test’s subjective element involves a determination

of the “awareness of the service provider of the facts or circumstances in

See id. at 523 (discussing § 512(d) and its proscription that "awareness of infringement . . .
should typically be imputed to a directory provider only with respect to pirate sites or in similarly
obvious and conspicuous circumstances").
59
Id. at 519.
60
Id. at 519-23.
61
The court ruled that "actual knowledge" means "actual or constructive knowledge of specific
and identifiable infringements."
62
Id.
63
Id. at 520.
58

15

question.”

64

The objective element is then used to determine “whether those

facts or circumstances constitute a “red flag”—in other words, whether
infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating
under the same or similar circumstances.”

65

The YouTube court also examined the Reports’ comparison between the
§ 512(d) provision’s “need for specificity” when dealing with information
location tools like Yahoo! and the § 512(c) provisions.

66

The Reports state

that under the “actual knowledge” and “not aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent” language, a service provider has no
obligation to seek out copyright infringement.

67

However, a service provider

would not qualify to benefit from the safe harbor if it “had turned a blind eye
to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement.”

68

The court elaborated that absent

such red flags or actual knowledge, a directory provider cannot be reasonably
expected to know whether content is infringing from a “brief cataloguing visit.”
69

This test was made to strike the right balance for online editors and

cataloguers, as it is unreasonable to require them to “make discriminating
judgments about potential copyright infringement” unless the case is
“obviously pirate.”

70

Id.
Id. at 520-21.
66
Id. at 522.
67
Id.
68
See id. (explaining an example of a clear red flag where a directory provider came across a
"pirate" site that allowed downloading of copyrighted material).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 523.
64
65
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Therefore, a high level of certainty of repeated infringement is required
before the name of the party or site can be qualified as a “red flag”.71 In
considering policy, the court reasoned that information location tools are
essential to the operation of the Internet.

72

Therefore, requiring a higher

standard for human judgment and discretion, when the legal question is
already complicated as it is, would have a chilling effect on whether directory
providers are willing to continuously catalogue potentially infringing material.
73

This conclusion suggests that the court seemed to be guided by the

utilitarian concept of potential societal loss outweighing the copyright holders’
actual loss.
YouTube applied a similar utilitarian reasoning to service providers as
well.

74

With regard to efficiency, the court reasoned that rights holders

themselves were in the best position to identify infringing material and
determent whether they wanted to stop an infringing action.

75

After

analyzing further commentary on other § 512 provisions, the court concluded
that the intentions of the DMCA were not to force service providers like
YouTube to affirmatively seek “facts indicating infringing activity” in order to
qualify for safe harbor protection.

76

Id.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
See id. at 524 (reasoning that the amount of infringing material on a service provider's
servers may be insignificant and the copyright owner or licensor is in the best position to determine if
they actually want to fight a case of infringement).
76
Id.
71
72
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The House and Senate Reports also provided clarification regarding how
to apply § 512(c)(1)(B), the provision that bars service providers from
receiving a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity. The
court stated that in a determination as to whether the financial benefit
criterion is satisfied, “courts should take a common-sense, fact-based
approach, not a formalistic one.”

77

Generally, this means that a service

provider conducting a legitimate business would not be considered to receive
a “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” where the
infringer makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing users of the
provider’s service.

78

For example, “receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat

periodic payments for service from a person engaging in infringing activities
would not constitute receiving a ‘financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity.’”

79

This analysis is a particularly relevant consideration

when trying to understand whether SoundCloud’s particular monetization
model is relevant under § 512(c)(1)(B).

80

3. Case Law
In YouTube, the court emphasized that the outcome of the case turned
on how specific the § 512(c)(1)(A) “actual knowledge” requirement was, and
what kind of “awareness” of infringement was expected from service

77
78
79
80

Id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
See infra, Part II.B.2.
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providers.

81

The court ultimately held that “general knowledge” that

infringement is “ubiquitous” does not impose a duty on the service provider
to monitor or search its services for infringement.

82

The court reached this

conclusion after examining previous cases that, while not binding precedent
on the court, used a line of reasoning that applied to providers that were
comparable in size and function to YouTube.

83

The court drew justification for its interpretation from Tiffany Inc. v.
eBay

84

, which involved a claim of contributory liability for trademark

infringement.

85

In eBay, the court held that Tiffany needed to show that eBay

knew of “specific instances of actual infringement,” and had more than a
“generalized notice” that some portion of the Tiffany goods sold on its website
“might be counterfeit.”

86

In drawing parallels between YouTube and eBay,

the court decided that, through the DMCA, Congress intended the copyright
holder to bear the burden of identifying specific instances of infringement.

87

Therefore, without a showing that YouTube knew of specific infringing material

Amanda Bronstad, 'Viacom v. YouTube' Appeal May Decide Future of Web, LTN L. TECH.
NEWS (Dec 14, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleFriendlyLTN.jsp?id=1202476144090&slreturn=
1&hbxlogin=1.
82
Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 525.
83
See id. at 524 (explaining that if the identification of cases of infringement required an
investigation of "facts and circumstances," then those cases did not constitute "red flags," and
explaining that a "blatant" showing of infringement was necessary to prove that Amazon had actual
knowledge of infringement by its users).
84
Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir 2010).
85
Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 525.
86
Id. (quoting Tiffany, 600 F.3d 93 at 106-07).
87
See id. (explaining that although Tiffany did not involve the DMCA, the DMCA applies the
same principle: without a "red flag" or notice from the owner of specific instances of infringement, the
service provider is not obligated to identify the infringement).
81

19

that was not quickly removed, Viacom could not win its case by invoking §
512(c)(1)(A).

88

With respect to the § 512(c)(1)(B) “financial benefit” requirement,
Viacom argued that YouTube received ad revenue which was directly
attributable to the infringing content at issue.

The court examined §

89

512(c)(1)(B)’s “right and ability to control” language and reasoned that
knowledge proceeds control.

90

The court reasoned that 512(c)(1)(B) requires

“the provider must know of the particular case before he can control it.”

91

Because it is the burden of the copyright holder to notify YouTube of specific
cases of infringement, YouTube virtually never “controls” infringing material
without having first received notice from the owner.

92

Having received notice

and promptly removing the infringing material, the court found that YouTube
had by all accounts acted in good faith and in compliance with the DMCA
guidelines for quick removal, and could therefore not be held liable for
infringement.

93

In August 2011, the appeal was argued before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and a decision was issued on April 5, 2012.

See id. ("[I]f a service provider knows . . . of specific instances of infringement, the provider
must promptly remove the infringing material. If not, the burden is on the owner to identify the
infringement. General knowledge that infringement is 'ubiquitous' does not impose a duty on the
service provider to monitor or search its service for infringements.").
89
Id. at 527.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
See id. ("[T]he provider must know of the particular case [of infringement] before he can
control it.").
93
See id. at 524 (explaining that after receiving notice of over 100,000 infringing videos from
Viacom, YouTube "had removed virtually all of them" by the next business day).
88
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94

The court of appeals determined that the district court correctly held that

§ 512(c)(1)(A) requires knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances
that indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement.

95

However,

the district court’s order granting summary judgment to YouTube was vacated
because the court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that YouTube
had knowledge or awareness under § 512(c)(1)(A) at least with respect to a
handful of specific clips.

96

The court also held that the willful blindness

doctrine may apply, in appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge
or awareness of specific instances of infringement.

97

Further, the appellate court found that the district court erred by
requiring

“item-specific”

knowledge

of

infringing

activity

under

§

512(c)(1)(B), and the judgment was reversed insofar as it rested on that
erroneous construction of the statute.

98

The appellate court affirmed the

district court’s holding that three of the challenged YouTube software
functions, replication, playback, and the related videos feature, occur “by
reason of the storage at the direction of a user” within the meaning of §
512(c)(1); however it remanded the cause for further fact-finding regarding

94

Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012)

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 24
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a fourth software function, involving the syndication of YouTube videos to third
parties.

99

The court of appeals set forth the following issues to be examined on
remand: (1) Whether YouTube had knowledge or awareness of any specific
infringements; (2) Whether YouTube willfully blinded itself to specific
infringements; (3) Whether YouTube had the “right and ability to control”
infringing activity within the meaning of § 512(c)(1)(B); (4) Whether any
clips-in-suit were syndicated to a third party and, if so, whether such
syndication occurred “by reason of the storage at the direction of the user”
within the meaning of § 512(c)(1), so that YouTube may claim the protection
of the § 512(c) safe harbor.

100

On April 18, 2013, the district court issued another order granting
summary judgment in favor of YouTube.

101

Following the remand from the

Second Circuit court of appeals, the district judge ruled on all four issues in
his decision.

102

The court ruled in favor of YouTube on all four issues finding

that YouTube had no actual knowledge of any specific instance of infringement
of Viacom’s works, and therefore could not have “willfully blinded itself” to the
infringement.

103

The court also found that YouTube did not have the “right

and ability to control” infringing activity because “there [was] no evidence that

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 940 F.Supp.2d 110

102

Id.

103

Id.
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YouTube induced its users to submit infringing videos, provided users with
detailed instruction about what content to upload or edited their content,
prescreened submissions for quality, steered users to infringing videos, or
otherwise interacted with infringing users to a point where it might be said to
have participated in their activity.”

104

This ruling came despite statements

made by YouTube employees that “[we should grow] as aggressively as we
can through whatever tactics, however evil … [the site is] out of control with
copyrighted material … [if we remove] the obviously copyright infringing stuff
… site traffic [would] drop to maybe 205 … steal it!”

105

Notably, YouTube

successfully argued that these quotations were taken out of context.
Subsequent to the district court’s holding, an appeal had begun, but
prior to the parties’ second appearance before the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, a settlement was announced, and it was reported that no money was
exchanged.106

B. Application of § 512(c) to SoundCloud

104

Docket Alarm, Inc. (April 18, 2013), (“Granting Defendant YouTube’s Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment; Entering Judgment that Defendants are Protected by the Safe-Harbor Provisions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) from all of Plaintiffs Copyright Infringement
Claims”), https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/New_York_Southern_District_Court/1--07-cv02103/Viacom_International_Inc._et_al_v._Youtube_Inc._et_al/452/
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Docket Alarm, Inc. (Black Entertainment Television, LLC, Comedy Partners, Country Music
Television, Inc., Paramount Pictures Corporation, Viacom International, Inc. (March 29, 2013),
“Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment”),
https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/New_York_Southern_District_Court/1--07-cv02103/Viacom_International_Inc._et_al_v._Youtube_Inc._et_al/446/
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Jonathan Stempel, “Google, Viacom settle landmark YouTube lawsuit”, (March 18, 2014),
REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-viacom-lawsuit-idUSBREA2H11220140318
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Using the YouTube court’s guidelines for applying § 512(c) to service
providers, SoundCloud and other similar platforms should fall under the DMCA
safe harbor. In turn, the DMCA safe harbor limits their potential liability for
infringing material uploaded to their servers.

As a company, SoundCloud

should consider relevant arguments that were made against YouTube to
appropriately protect itself.

107

1. § 512(c)(1)(A)
The YouTube court’s interpretation of “actual knowledge” requires
SoundCloud to have knowledge of “specific and identifiable infringements of
particular items” beyond the “mere knowledge of prevalence of such activity
in general.”

108

Here, SoundCloud does not directly monitor uploads. Rather,

it utilizes the Audible Magic technology to preemptively stop infringement. In
a potential suit, an argument on behalf of rights holders that SoundCloud has
“actual knowledge” is likely to be unsuccessful. Assuming arguendo, if the title
of an uploaded song somehow indicated that the song could potentially
infringe a copyright,

109

it would not constitute actual knowledge under the

court’s ruling. For example, an artist of a remix might secure a license from

Cf. Mike Masnick, YouTube 's Reply In Viacom Case Demolishes Each of Viacom's Key
Arguments, TECHDIRT (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:48 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110401/02080513719/youtubes-reply-viacom-case-demolisheseach-viacoms-key-arguments.shtml (describing YouTube's response to Viacom's appeal).
108
Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 523.
109
Such potential infringement might, for instance, be identified as a remix of a top pop song
appearing on SoundCloud's "Hot" list. See, e.g., Explore Tracks,
SOUNDCLOUD, http://soundcloud.com/tracks (last visited Dec. 4, 2016).
107
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the original musician but a SoundCloud employee would not have knowledge
of such license without further inquiry.
To satisfy the actual knowledge standard, a plaintiff would have to show
that SoundCloud knew the song is infringing. If the song passes the Audible
Magic filter, showing actual knowledge requires SoundCloud to proactively
contact the presumed rights holder. Arguably, such a requirement extends to
the type of “investigative duties” that the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 v. Google
110

attempted to discourage.

111

Therefore, the actual knowledge requirement

would be difficult to prove.
Section 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) sets forth a more challenging hurdle for
SoundCloud to overcome. This subsection sets forth the inquiry of whether
SoundCloud, “is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent,” and the “red flag” test used to verify it.

112

The

controlling question will be whether any red flags objectively exist on
SoundCloud’s servers. In other words, “whether infringing activities would
have been apparent to a reasonable person” in the “same or similar
circumstances” as one of SoundCloud’s employees.

113

This analysis involves

both an objective and subjective component. Even if infringing material can
objectively be identified as a red flag, the subjective element still exists,
requiring a determination of how aware SoundCloud is of these red flags.

110
111
112
113

Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007).
See Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 524 (quoting Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114).
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 520-21.
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Awareness is easier to prove if the infringing material is highly visible or if the
artists themselves are highly visible—for example, the content available on
the SoundCloud “Explore Tracks” page.

114

If an obviously infringing track

bypassed the Audible Magic filter, and became popular enough to reach such
a heightened level of exposure, then SoundCloud would be required to remove
that content under § 512(c)(a)(A)(iii).
The DMCA’s legislative history indicates that it is “not possible to identify
a uniform time limit for expeditious action,” due to “factual circumstances”
and “technical parameters” that vary on a case by case basis.

115

When

SoundCloud receives specific knowledge of infringing material, it is usually
through a copyright holder’s notice, at which point SoundCloud acts quickly to
send out takedown notices immediately, in accordance with § 512(c)(A)(iii).
116

Considering that the statute is flexible enough to apply case-specific

determinations when deciding the appropriate time limit, the promptness of
SoundCloud’s response is likely to satisfy the “expeditious action” requirement
expounded in YouTube.

Echoing YouTube’s procedural safeguards against

infringement should allow SoundCloud to defeat a § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii)
challenge.

2. § 512(c)(1)(B)

See Explore Tracks, supra note 98 (listing the "Hot" and "Latest" tracks).
Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 521.
116
See Mann, supra note 44 (discussing how producers often complain about having remixes
taken down due to copyright complaints).
114
115
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SoundCloud’s business model can be used to eliminate the financial
benefit that the company receives from the presence of infringing materials
on its servers.

The way that the DMCA’s legislative history treats service

providers that require a “one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments”
favorably supports the conclusion that SoundCloud meets the § 512(c)(1)(B)
requirement.

117

SoundCloud benefits from the application of the YouTube

court’s ruling that “control” is not possible without specific knowledge and that
the DMCA does not place the burden on the provider to proactively seek
specific knowledge of infringing uploads.
Contrarily, a copyright holder may argue that, by allowing its users to
upload and download songs in greater quantities according to the increase in
payment by a user, SoundCloud has created a distinguishable feature that
incentivizes paying for premium accounts, therefore violating § 512(c)(1)(B).
However, this argument is necessarily premised on the proposition that
SoundCloud’s limit on uploading and downloading for free accounts is a
purposeful institution. SoundCloud would have to be both aware of infringing
material uploaded to its servers, and want users to purchase higher level
accounts in order to upload with fewer restrictions. SoundCloud should not
be too concerned with § 512(c)(1)(B) as this is a difficult argument to support
with probative evidence.

117

See Youtube, 718 F.Supp.2d at 521.
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3. §512(c)(1)(C)
Like YouTube, SoundCloud needs to proactively identify and eliminate
blatant and repeated infringement, which is already satisfied through the
implementation of Audible Magic. SoundCloud can address more egregious
cases of potential infringement that bypass the technology by following §
512(c)(1)(C)’s provisions for timely notice and takedown.

118

An examination

of SoundCloud’s terms of use demonstrates strict adherence to the DMCA’s
guidelines. The “reasonably implemented” requirement set forth under §
512(i)(1)(A) should be satisfied, as SoundCloud’s notice and takedown
procedures have been implement with the interests of rights holders as a
paramount concern.

119

Conclusion
The potentially infringing material that exists on SoundCloud’s servers
remains the primary concern for the company.

Without the assistance of

copyright holders, the legality of potentially infringing material is difficult for
SoundCloud, and other similar service providers, to unilaterally determine.
According to the holding in YouTube, SoundCloud should be assured that their
policies fully protect them against liability under the DMCA § 512(c) safe
harbor. In the interim, the implementation of Audible Magic should be an

118
119

Id. at 522.
Raymer, supra note 42.
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effective precautionary mechanism.

120

In the long term, the problem that

SoundCloud faces is the reconciliation of their preventative measures with the
original creative purpose of their innovative platform.

121

Mike Masnick, Permission Culture And The Automated Diminishment Of Fair Use, TECHDIRT
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remakes and remixes that can't be found through official channels.").
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